

All this is discussed in Chapter Two, which in itself represents a significant contribution to the field of early Ottoman historiography.

In Chapter Three, having provided the necessary context, the author turns in earnest to the shrines themselves. The first is that of Seyyid Gazi, south of Eskişehir, named after the early Islamic warrior Seyyid Battal Gazi; the second that of Hacı Bektaş, 'a Turcoman Sufi who established a convent near Kırşehir' in the aftermath of the Mongol conquest of Anatolia (p. 4). While both were originally founded in the thirteenth century, well before the Ottoman state had come into existence, they were remodelled in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with funds provided by members of the great frontier-lord families based in the distant Balkans. This patronage, which fitted into established Turco-Mongol practice, resulted in complexes with courtyards and other palatial aspects reminiscent of the Ottoman palaces in Istanbul and Edirne. To the frontier lords, Edirne and other provincial towns were always preferable to Istanbul, which represented the Byzantine legacy and the aims of the central government. Nonetheless, the standards for imperial architecture were set in Istanbul, so that today the complex of Seyyid Gazi, perched atop a hill, bears a striking resemblance to the Topkapı Palace, complete with domes and kitchens. The buildings that make up both complexes are discussed further in Chapter Four, which focuses on their religious meaning in the wider context of other shrines in the larger Turco-Mongol and Islamic world.

In terms of its content, Yürekli's book is remarkably dense as it draws on a wide variety of visual, narrative and archival sources. However, all of this is woven together masterfully in a way that is stylistically elegant, clear and compelling. While the Ashgate edition has not allowed for large or colour plates, the illustrations are nonetheless of a high enough quality (with the possible exception of the maps), and the full use of footnotes makes for a very scholarly book, which is nonetheless accessible to students and researchers of all kinds. As a very interdisciplinary piece of work drawing on both visual and textual material, this joins other recent publications (notably books by Çiğdem Kafescioğlu and Shirine Hamadeh) making use of a similar approach to shed light on other important aspects of the development of Ottoman culture and society. Given the key position of Alevis-Bektashis both in Ottoman history and in modern Turkish society, Zeynep Yürekli's book is likely to be indispensable for readers in both fields, as well as those interested in the wider history of religion and the Middle East.

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doi:10.1093/ehr/ceu109

L'Assassino del Duca: Esilio e morte di Lorenzino de' Medici, by Stefano Dall'Aglio (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2011; pp. 420. €39).

In the middle of the night of 6 January 1537, the Duke of Florence, Alessandro de' Medici (1510/11–1537), was stabbed and slashed to death by three assassins, one of whom was his cousin and boon companion, Lorenzino de' Medici. A womaniser, Lorenzino had arranged for Alessandro to meet the latest target of his intended affections in an apartment near the Medici palace; there, with his guard down and his chain-mail shirt off, the Duke instead met his death.

Lorenzino then went about Florence knocking on a few doors of Medici enemies in a desultory attempt at raising the Florentines to throw out the tyrants and reclaim liberty. No one believed that the Duke was dead. Lorenzino fled the city for Venice, where Florentine exiles had found shelter from Medici-controlled Florence. Principal among them was Filippo Strozzi, an erstwhile Medici supporter, who declared Lorenzino to be the 'Tuscan Brutus'. Other nicknames for Lorenzino were 'Lorenzino traditore' and 'il filòsofo' (because, ironically enough, he was said to have been deathly afraid of weapons).

Although much ink has been spilled over the question, we will perhaps never know why Lorenzino murdered his cousin, his best friend, and his Duke. Stefano Dall'Aglio here asks two different questions: what did Lorenzino do between the time he fled Florence and the point of his own assassination in March 1547; and who pursued this vendetta against him—was it Cosimo I de' Medici, Alessandro's successor, or Emperor Charles V, whose illegitimate daughter, Margherita, had just been married to the Duke and was desperate, emotionally and otherwise, after his murder? The historiography and Medici propaganda have, from the time of Cosimo I, credited him with being the prime mover; but Dall'Aglio reveals, through a series of newly discovered documents in the Spanish archives at Simancas, that Lorenzino's death should be credited to Charles. What follows is a narrative exposition of this new material.

Dall'Aglio traces Lorenzino's efforts while in exile to raise support for attacking Florence. Lorenzino travelled to the Turkish court of Suleiman the Magnificent, looking for money and ships with which to launch attacks on Tuscan ports. Failing there, he then moved to France, to the court of Francis I, seeking to convince the king to invade Florence in order to take it away from his dynastic enemy, the emperor. Although he was sustained by Florentine exiles at the French court, no help came from that quarter. The Italian peninsula lay firmly under Spanish control by this point; with no real help coming from outside, the exiles mounted an invasion of Florence on their own, led by Filippo Strozzi. Cosimo defeated this attempted invasion, capturing Filippo, but Lorenzino remained at large. He returned to Venice where he found himself almost alone, as most of the other exiles had decamped from the city.

In his chapter on the 'Anatomia di un omicidio', Dall'Aglio argues that it was Charles, more than anyone, who wanted Lorenzino dead. He points to the extraordinary—and unprecedented—rewards for the deed. To kill Lorenzino, one had to know what his routines were and to find men willing to kill him and risk arrest by the Venetians. To this end, agents of Cosimo and Charles were sent to Venice to obtain this information. Dall'Aglio identifies the two soldiers who took on the task and successfully carried out the murder. The two fled for protection to Florence, where they were richly rewarded. They soon wrote their story of the killing.

I find Dall'Aglio's argument overall to be convincing. His archival research in Simancas has brought out new documents that redirect the current historiography regarding Lorenzino after the tyrannicide. He has placed copies of his documentation in a thorough series of appendices, which in itself is a real service. But I disagree with his conclusion that Filippo Strozzi had no role in leading Lorenzino to the assassination of the Duke; that it was all Lorenzino's responsibility, even though we may never know precisely why. Yet Filippo had ample reason to hate Alessandro. The Duke had tried to have his

son Piero assassinated because of competition over a woman. Alessandro had also tried to have Filippo removed from the good graces of pope Clement VII, for whom Filippo ran the papal Exchequer (much to his profit). Lorenzino was very close to the Strozzi family from his previous years in Rome, and he kept up this contact after transferring to Florence, where he proceeded to ingratiate himself with his cousin. 'Il filòsofo' confided to Piero that he was considering killing Alessandro; if this is true, it follows that Piero probably confided these musings to his father. At the very least, Filippo decided to keep quiet about this threat while still serving the pope and the Duke. Lorenzino had not revealed a timetable, so perhaps this is why the Strozzi family kept quiet. Who knew if Lorenzino would really act? By his silence Filippo is at least complicit in Alessandro's murder.

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doi:10.1093/ehr/ceu107

Church Music and Protestantism in Post-Reformation England: Discourses, Sites and Identities, by Jonathan Willis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010; pp. 294. £55).

His title notwithstanding, Jonathan Willis investigates the contexts and ideologies of religious music in Elizabethan England. Taking a narrower time-frame and remit than Christopher Marsh, whose wide-ranging social study of music in society was also published in 2010 (rev. *ante*, cxxvi [2011], 1522–4), Willis argues for a positive assessment of the musical legacy of the Elizabethan church. Many local traditions which had been so carefully nurtured before the 1540s persisted after 1558; the musical traditions of cathedrals and parish churches were less starkly divergent than previously thought; music played an active role in the process of Protestantisation; and, although the social benefits and moral risks of music were contested, religious opinion was more finely shaded than the Convocation votes of 1562 would imply.

Willis defines 'church music' widely, encompassing almost any form of Protestant music-making, vocal or instrumental, liturgical or devotional, public or domestic—justifiably, given the absence of musical guidance in the 1559 Book of Common Prayer. While the 1552 Book of Common Prayer provided liturgists with a clear textual reference point, the Edwardian musical Reformation had been an uncompleted project defined, largely in negative terms, against the traditional liturgy: not in Latin, not melismatic, not over-burdened with seasonal variations, not superstitious, not sustained by intercessory institutions and, ultimately, not choral. Vernacular metrical psalmody was not yet used in public worship by 1553. Instead, the Edwardian musical legacy was a mixed bag of experimentation, adaptation and wait-and-see.

The austere influence of Heinrich Bullinger was responsible for the 'overwhelmingly aggressive' attitude towards music of his Edwardian devotees. Five years later, the Marian exiles returned home with more positive theological understandings of church music, quickened by metrical psalmody. This added a distinctive new element within the revived Edwardian mix: an archetype of congregational song. The continuing lack of a coherent official music policy meanwhile permitted wide latitudes between Geneva-inclined